

Our Narrative

Three Steps:

- **Step 1:** A tax increase in a tax on paper leads to a change in the French literati's book diet due to a substitution effect. The consumption of illegal books increases.
- **Step 2:** The books flow into the French Kingdom from an area dubbed the *Fertile Crescent* of Enlightenment publishing. Cities closer to the *Fertile Crescent* experience more of an inflow of books and a more intense revolutionary period.
- **Step 3:** Is the mechanism the one outlined by Darnton (1982)? We observe the effects of elite overproduction in Paris on literary output.

La France Littéraire (Quérard, 1839)

- Compiled by the **bibliographer Joseph-Marie Quérard**;
- The idea: A *"complete national bibliography"*.
- Claims to contain **all works published in French between 1700 and 1830**.
- Supported by a **government subsidy** granted by François Guizot (the dominant political figure of the July Monarchy).

Quasi-official Journals

LE
JOURNAL
 DES
SÇAVANS,
 POUR
 L'ANNÉE M. DCC. LXXX.
 JANVIER,



A PARIS;
 Au Bureau du Journal de Paris, rue de Grenelle S. Honoré,
 près celle du Pélican.

M. DCC. LXXX.
 AVEC PRIVILÈGE DU ROI

- We have every volume of the *Mercure de France* and the *Journal des Sçavans* published between 1740 and 1791
- Digitised by BNF Gallica
- List of authors.

Pensions in the Post-revolutionary Period

Ministre de l'Intérieur
Le 20 Vendémiaire

État des salaires et émoluments
accordés à chaque ministre, par le décret et l'ordonnance de
l'Assemblée nationale, conformément à la décision du
Ministre de l'Intérieur.

Nom de la personne	Quantité à payer
Caracciolo	120
Reinier	150
Deanton	200
De la Roche (Goyon)	150
Sombré & Co	150
Beaulard Desmoulin	150
Blapel	100
Maréchal	150
Bouy	150
Dubocage (on)	150
Morand	150
Memier (on)	100
Morey	75
Beauchamp (on)	150
Desmilly	120
Mouton	120
Montale	200
Le Brun	200
Dumoulin (on)	100
Jeanraud	100
Boussie	50
Lucini	150
Total 2950	

Le 20 Vendémiaire
1796

- In one of the dossiers, we found a list of writers being awarded a pension by the revolutionary government in 1798 (5th Vendémiaire year VII).

What about the *Low Enlightenment*

What do we know about the people who did *not manage to make a living as writers* - Darnton's ***Grub Street***?

We have the following pieces of information:

- Rivarol and Champcenetz (1808) publish a '***mock census***' of **failed writers** for the year 1788 (***Petit almanach de nos grands hommes***).
- The *Low Enlightenment* has its own journal, ***Les Nouvelles de la République des Lettres et des Arts***.

Police Spies

Differences-in-Differences: Regression Framework

Treatments

Tax introduction:

- $Treated_t = 1$ if $t > 1^{st}$ March 1771 and $t < 1783$ or
- $Treated_t = 1$ if $t > 23^{rd}$ April 1775 and $t < 1783$ $Treated_t = 1$ if $t > March/August$ 1771 and $t < 1783$

New publishing code: $Treated_t = 1$ if $t > August$ 1777 and $t < 1783$

Surtax of 10 sous: $Treated_t = 1$ if $t > 1^{st}$ January 1782 and $t < 1783$

Crackdown: $Treated_t = 1$ if $t > 1783$

Treatment Groups

- We define the **treated group** as towns within the **18th Century Kingdom of France**.
- The **control group is Non-French-speaking Europe**. French-speaking Europe is excluded because it includes what Darnton (2021) calls the *Fertile Crescent* of illegal publishing from Brussels to Avignon. Illegal booksellers and publishers in these cities would often send each other books that these houses would then ship to their customers. This means that increasing demand in France also increases shipments to the *Fertile Crescent*.

DiD - France vs. Non-French-speaking Europe - 1775 as tax cutoff

Table 1: Difference-in-Differences Regression Results

	(1) $Sales_{c,t}$	(2) $Sales_{c,t}$	(3) $\ln(Sales_{c,t})$	(4) $\ln(Sales_{c,t})$
$France_c = 1$	-431.4* (214.6)	-405.9* (228.3)	-0.118** (0.0514)	-0.113* (0.0541)
$France_c = 1 \times post_{paper\ tax, 1775} = 1$	6506.6*** (1059.0)	6483.6*** (1071.2)	1.028*** (0.150)	1.023*** (0.152)
$France_c = 1 \times post_{publishing\ code, 1777} = 1$	-3696.7*** (1222.5)	-3667.5*** (1250.8)	-0.632*** (0.161)	-0.629*** (0.164)
$France_c = 1 \times post_{surtax, 1782} = 1$	12288.4*** (968.8)	12341.3*** (984.3)	0.584*** (0.115)	0.589*** (0.117)
$France_c = 1 \times post_{crackdown, 1783} = 1$	-4637.5* (2519.0)	-4736.6* (2457.5)	-0.873*** (0.281)	-0.881*** (0.280)
Constant	7850.0*** (223.8)	7810.8*** (199.9)	8.862*** (0.0240)	8.854*** (0.0223)
Population Control Included		✓		✓
Observations	2891	2729	2891	2729

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ 

DiD - France vs. Non-French-speaking Europe - 1771 as tax cutoff

Table 2: Difference-in-Differences Regression Results

	(1) $Sales_{c,t}$	(2) $Sales_{c,t}$	(3) $\ln(Sales_{c,t})$	(4) $\ln(Sales_{c,t})$
$France_c = 1$	-801.5*** (111.2)	-624.9*** (98.10)	-0.283*** (0.00963)	-0.250*** (0.0108)
$France_c = 1 \times post_{paper\ tax,1771}=1$	3546.1** (1447.5)	3396.0** (1464.4)	0.671*** (0.225)	0.641*** (0.228)
$France_c = 1 \times post_{publishing\ code,1777}=1$	-366.2 (1584.4)	-370.9 (1599.9)	-0.110 (0.238)	-0.113 (0.239)
$France_c = 1 \times post_{surtax,1782}=1$	12288.4*** (968.8)	12341*** (984.3)	0.584*** (0.115)	0.589*** (0.117)
$France_c = 1 \times post_{crackdown,1783}=1$	2239.2 (2311.9)	1952.3 (2235.8)	0.319 (0.248)	0.276 (0.246)
Constant	7078.1*** (223.8)	7061.5*** (199.9)	8.745*** (0.0240)	8.756*** (0.0223)
Population Control Included		✓		✓
Observations	2891	2729	2891	2729

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Differences-in-Differences - Results by Category

Table 3: DiD Results by Category - $\ln(Sales_{c,t})$

	(1) Enlightenment	(2) Revolutionary	(3) Science	(4) Catholic	(5) "Low Enl."	(6) Pornography
<i>France_c</i>	-0.580 (0.149)	-0.188 (0.142)	-0.275* (0.148)	-0.750*** (0.160)	-0.444*** (0.166)	-0.447*** (0.146)
Paper Tax (1775)	1.346*** (0.246)	1.490*** (0.270)	0.887*** (0.175)	0.539*** (0.172)	1.153*** (0.326)	1.718*** (0.329)
Publishing Code	-0.919* (0.485)	-0.0552 (0.522)	-0.805*** (0.227)	-0.735*** (0.442)	-0.605 (0.247)	-0.491 (0.499)
Surtax (1782)	1.352*** (0.452)	0.154 (0.522)	0.354 (0.227)	0.336 (0.442)	0.262 (0.247)	-0.0938 (0.499)
Crackdown	-1.413*** (0.445)	-2.514*** (0.307)	-0.591** (0.263)	-1.528** (0.573)	-1.499** (0.573)	-2.380*** (0.311)
Constant	7.006*** (0.0991)	6.462*** (0.102)	6.839*** (0.0771)	6.604*** (0.0985)	2.995*** (0.0912)	6.718*** (0.116)
Population Included	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1600	939	1551	1290	135	800

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ 

Utility of Book Consumer:

$$u(B_l, B_i) = B_{l,m} + B_{l,stn} + (1 + \zeta)B_i \quad (1)$$

Where:

- $B_{l,m}$: Legal books from Paris Guild;
- $B_{l,stn}$: Legal books from semi-legal publishers;
- B_i : Illegal books from semi-legal publishers;
- ζ : Additional utility derived from illegal books.

Budget Constraint

$$m_b = (p_m + \tau)B_{l,m} + p_{stn}B_{l,stn} + (p_{stn} + \rho)B_i \quad (2)$$

Where:

- m_b : Endowment allocated to purchase of books;
- p_m : Price of Paris Guild monopoly;
- p_{stn} : Price of semi-legal publishers;
- ρ : Risk associated with illegal books;
- τ : Tax on paper.

Alternative Specification

Comparative Statics

If we solve this, we get the following results:

- The Paris Guild is dominated by the semi-legal publishers' *legal* fare when:

$$\tau > p_{stn} - p_m$$

- The Paris Guild is dominated by the semi-legal publishers' *illegal* fare when:

$$\tau > \frac{p_{stn}}{1+\zeta-\rho} - p_m$$

- Thus if τ crosses the threshold:
 - If $\zeta > \rho$ consumer shifts to illegal books;
 - If $\zeta < \rho$ consumer shifts to legal books by semi-legal publishers;
 - If $\zeta = \rho$ consumer is indifferent between the two semi-legal types.

Predictions

- **A) Consumers for whom the additional utility** of illegal books ζ **is lower** than the *additional* risk associated with illegal books ρ , will switch to illegally imported legal books as soon as the tax is higher than the price difference between the Guild and the STN.
- **B) Consumers for whom the additional utility** of illegal books ζ **is higher** than the risk associated with illegal books ρ , will switch to illegal books as soon as $\tau > \frac{P_{stn}}{1+\zeta-\rho} - p_m$
- As we expect there to be consumers for both case A) and case B), as well as consumers for whom ρ is prohibitively high, **we expect:**
 - **Substitution Effect:** Tax boosts the *STN* sales of illegal books (case A);
 - **Price Effect:** Tax boosts the *STN* sales of legal books (case B);
 - The tax *increase* will lead to both a substitution and a price effect by "switching" people with a higher individual ρ .

Printed Drug - Sasaki (2025)

- Sasaki (2025) focuses on a list of **720 illegal books** from Darnton (1995). Inflow of Illegal Books
- He uses the number of *émigrés* (Greer, 1951) and the number of executions during the *terreur* (Greer, 1935) as a measure for the **intensity of the Revolution**. Intensity of Revolution
- He finds that an inflow of illegal books is associated with **more émigrés and executions among nobles and clergymen** but not among the middle classes. Results
- *But* there is an **endogeneity problem**.
- Can we find a source of **exogenous variation** for the inflow of books?

Distance to Neuchâtel - Sasaki (2025)

Distance to Neuchâtel and Book Sales

Table 4: Distance from Neuchâtel and Book Sales

	(1) Books per 1,000 inhabitants (ln)	(2) Copies	(3) ln Copies	(4) ln Copies
Distance from Neuchâtel in km (ln)	-0.950*** (0.171)	-3990.9*** (586.4)	-0.997*** (0.205)	-0.921*** (0.204)
Population Bairoch et al. (1988)		0.0255*** (0.00571)		
ln Population Bairoch et al. (1988)			1.068*** (0.164)	1.155*** (0.165)
Dummy French-speaking				0.837** (0.350)
Constant	8.459*** (1.003)	24619.9*** (3356.8)	1.140 (1.411)	-0.606 (1.568)
Observations	141	141	141	141

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Also works if we drop Neuchâtel from the Sample

Table 5: Distance from Neuchâtel and Book Sales (excluding Neuchâtel)

	(1) Books per 1,000 inhabitants (ln)	(2) Copies	(3) ln Copies	(4) ln Copies
Distance from Neuchâtel in km (ln)	-0.885*** (0.199)	-1918.8*** (602.0)	-0.923*** (0.243)	-0.831*** (0.241)
Population Bairoch et al. (1988)		0.0207*** (0.00505)		
ln Population Bairoch et al. (1988)			1.047*** (0.168)	1.131*** (0.169)
Dummy French-speaking				0.848** (0.351)
Constant	8.069*** (1.173)	12571.1*** (3461.3)	0.915 (1.469)	-0.902 (1.628)
Observations	140	140	140	140

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

First Stage (Baillage-level)

Table 6: Inflows from Neuchâtel and Predicted Book Sales

	(1) ln Copies inhabitants (ln)	(2) ln Copies	(3) ln Copies
Predicted Inflow (Major centers)	0.730*** (0.251)		
Predicted Inflow (Minor centers)		0.644*** (0.238)	
Predicted Inflow (All towns)			0.620*** (0.236)
Constant	1.387 (1.629)	1.859 (1.575)	2.001 (1.568)
Observations	59	59	59

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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
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List of Police Spies



- Many "Grub Street" writers were forced to earn a living as spies for the Paris police force.
- The autobiography of the lieutenant-général de police Jean-Charles-Pierre Lenoir contains a nine-page list of police spies.
- They are not referred to by their names, however.

Back

Utility of Book Consumer:

$$u(B_l, B_i) = B_{l,m} + B_{l,sn} + (1 + \zeta)B_i \quad (8)$$

Where:

- $B_{l,m}$: Legal books from Paris Guild;
- $B_{l,sn}$: Legal books from semi-legal publishers;
- B_i : Illegal books from semi-legal publishers;
- ζ : Additional utility derived from illegal books.

Budget Constrain

$$m_b = (p_m + \tau)B_{l,m} + (p_{sn} + \rho_1)B_{l,sn} + (p_{sn} + \rho_2)B_i \quad (9)$$

Where:

- m_b : Endowment allocated to purchase of books;
- p_m : Price of Paris Guild monopoly;
- p_{sn} : Price of semi-legal publishers;
- ρ : Risk associated with books by semi-legal publishers, where $\rho_1 < \rho_2$;
- τ : Tax on paper.

Back

Comparative Statics

If we solve this, we get the following results:


- The Paris Guild is dominated by the semi-legal publishers' *legal* fare when:

$$\tau > \frac{p_{stn}}{1-\rho_1} - p_m$$


- The Paris Guild is dominated by the semi-legal publishers' *illegal* fare when:

$$\tau > \frac{p_{stn}}{1+\zeta-\rho_2} - p_m$$

- Thus if τ crosses the threshold:
 - If $\zeta > \rho_2 - \rho_1$ consumer shifts to illegal books;
 - If $\zeta < \rho_2 - \rho_1$ consumer shifts to legal books by semi-legal publishers;
 - If $\zeta = \rho_2 - \rho_1$ consumer is indifferent between the two semi-legal types.

$\zeta > \rho_2 - \rho_1$ - Switch to Illegal Books

$\zeta < \rho_2 - \rho_1$ - Switch to "Semi-legal Books"




Predictions

- **A) Consumers for whom the additional utility** of illegal books ζ is **lower** than the *additional* risk associated with illegal books *with respect to* illegally imported books, will switch to illegally imported legal books as soon as $\tau > \frac{p_{stn}}{1-\rho_1} - p_m$
- **B) Consumers for whom the additional utility** of illegal books ζ is **higher** than the *additional* risk associated with illegal books *with respect to* illegally imported books, will switch to illegal books as soon as $\tau > \frac{p_{stn}}{1+\zeta-\rho_2} - p_m$
- As we expect there to be consumers for both case A) and case B), as well as consumers for whom ρ is prohibitively high, **we expect:**
 - **Substitution Effect:** Tax boosts the *STN* sales of illegal books (case A);
 - **Price Effect:** Tax boosts the *STN* sales of legal books (case B);
 - The tax *increase* will lead to both a substitution and a price effect by "switching" people with a higher individual ρ .

Inflow of Illegal Books - Sasaki (2025)



(a) Diffusion by nearest dealer



(b) Diffusion by dealer with highest intensity

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Intensity of Revolution - Sasaki (2025)



(a) Number of émigrés



(b) Number of death sentences

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
Results - Sasaki (2025)

Dependent variable	All categories		Émigrés after the Revolution				Upper middle class	
			Nobility		Clergy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Illegal books diffused by	0.300		0.132***		0.069**		-0.002	
- nearest bookdealer	(0.307)		(0.034)		(0.034)		(0.037)	
- highest-impact bookdealer		0.308		0.132***		0.071**		-0.00003
		(0.304)		(0.034)		(0.033)		(0.036)
	All categories		Death sentences after the Revolution				Upper middle class	
			Nobility		Clergy			
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Illegal books diffused by	0.124		0.013		0.007		0.015	
- nearest bookdealer	(0.075)		(0.010)		(0.004)		(0.012)	
- highest-impact bookdealer		0.124*		0.013		0.007		0.015
		(0.074)		(0.010)		(0.004)		(0.012)
Observations	87	87	87	87	87	87	87	87

Notes: "All categories" go beyond the nobility, clergy, and upper middle class to include others, such as the lower middle class, working class, peasants, and the unclassified. Intercept is dropped. *** denote $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, and * $p < 0.1$.

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Distance from Neuchâtel - Sasaki (2025)




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A More Sophisticated Measure of Distance

- We can also implement a more sophisticated measure of "distance from Neuchâtel".
- We have information on the **crates** the books were shipped in.
- The names of the crates may contain information on the journey of individual shipments.
- I use the first two letters of a crate name to reconstruct paths.
- The *FBTEE* website indicates that the paths of shipments can be deduced.
- We can use distance of a town from the least-cost-path between two centers (See Weigand & Bosshard (*forthcoming*) Weigand and Bosshart (tbd))

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
Path of Crate J.M. - From Neuchâtel to Marseille



Path of Crate J.F. - From Lyon to Mannheim



Path of Crate J.G. - From Strasbourg to Bologna



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